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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile events from the Columbia space shuttle
disaster and Catholic Church sex scandal to the debacles at major
U.S. corporations and financial institutions have caused a renewed
interest in the subject of organizational misconduct.1 Yet we still
know relatively little about this extremely important subject. For example, what induces large and important segments of an organization
to engage in or ignore deviant behavior? What does and should our
legal system do to deter such behavior? Are we currently doing
enough?
This Article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (the OSGs) in 1991, the
United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of
strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational
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John Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, Report on Loss of Shuttle Focuses on NASA Blunders and
Issues Somber Warning, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2003, at A1 (quoting a report of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board that blames NASA’s “broken safety culture” for the Columbia disaster); David
France, Our Fathers: The Secret Life of the Catholic Church in an Age of Scandal (2004) (discussing the role of the Catholic Church hierarchy in sustaining and covering up the sexual misconduct of
numerous priests). Organizational misconduct--conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization--should be distinguished from occupational misconduct--conduct undertaken solely to benefit the
perpetrator and in which the organization may actually be the victim. See Marshall Clinard & R.
Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology 188 (2d ed. 1973) (dividing white collar crime into
two types: corporate crime and occupational crime); John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 Ann.
Rev. Soc. 1, 19 (1985) (same). Common examples of occupational misconduct include embezzlement
and the acceptance of kickbacks. In addition, the term “organizational misconduct” encompasses actions
by all organizations, including corporations, nonprofits, and government entities, and includes not only
crimes, but torts and violations of the organization’s ethics or conduct codes, even when such violations
are not illegal. See, e.g., Laura Shill Schrager & James F. Short, Jr., Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. Probs. 407 (1978) (defining “organizational crime”).
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liability.2 Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies
typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by
inquiring whether the organization had in place “internal compliance
structures” ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct.3
I argue, however, that any duty-based liability system that
conditions the organization’s duty on the presence of internal compliance structures is likely to fail because courts lack sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal
compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of
largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct.
This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures.
I then explore two possible explanations for the U.S. legal
system’s move toward a compliance-based liability regime: (1) an
over-reliance on agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct and (2) public choice explanations. I argue that an overreliance
on agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct and rentseeking by powerful interest groups both contribute to the growth of
internal compliance-based liability regimes. As a result, the United
States legal regime is likely to continue its march toward duty-based
liability regimes that rely on internal compliance structures in assessing liability or sanctions, because deep-rooted theoretical and political forces conspire to promote such a regime.
Part II of this Article discusses the three primary methods for
assigning firm-level liability for agent misconduct: strict vicarious liability, negligence, and a composite liability regime that combines
elements of both negligence and strict liability.4 Both negligence and
composite liability regimes require a court or agency determination
regarding whether the organization has met its duty of care, typically
2.

Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approximates a rule of “pure strict
vicarious liability”).
3.
See infra Part III.A (defining the term “internal compliance structures”). This move toward
“compliance-oriented” regulation is part of a global trend. See Christine Parker, Reinventing Regulation
Within the Corporation, 32 (5) ADMININSTRATION & SOCIETY 529, 529-30 (2000).
4.
Hereafter, negligence-based vicarious liability and composite liability regimes are collectively
referred to as “duty-based liability regimes,” except where the context requires a distinction between the
two.
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determined by reference to the organization’s internal compliance
structures. However, because courts and agencies lack reliable information regarding the effectiveness of such structures, internal compliance-based liability systems are likely to fail. As elaborated in Part
II, this does not mean that strict vicarious liability systems are perfect
or costless. However, many of these costs can be minimized through
evidentiary privilege rules, mitigation rules that reward reporting and
cooperation after the discovery of organizational misconduct, and
various other relatively mild changes to the legal regime.
Part III argues that, although the OSGs are typically held out
as an ideal model of duty-based organizational liability, large and important areas of United States law are actually duty-based organizational liability regimes. Indeed, in many areas of law--including environmental, tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities,
and health care—organizational liability for agent misconduct is determined either through a composite regime that assigns blame based
on a strict liability standard and determines sanctions based on a negligence standard or a negligence-based regime that bases organizational liability on a finding that the organization failed to satisfy the
standard of due care. In both cases, the organization’s negligence is
determined by reference to a standard of due care that rewards organizations for (and, correspondingly, punishes organizations for the
lack of) internal compliance structures.
Part IV argues, however, that the presumed effectiveness of
duty-based liability regimes that premise organizational culpability
on the presence of internal compliance structures is backed by little,
if any, empirical support. Although there has been relatively little
comprehensive study of the impact of internal compliance structures
on the incidence of organizational misconduct, the available empirical evidence does not support the contention that the internal compliance structures typically examined by courts and regulators in assessing organizational due care reduce organizational misconduct. Indeed, several large-scale empirical studies document a positive correlation between organizational misconduct and the types of internal
compliance structures most frequently relied on by courts and regulators in assessing liability and sanctions, suggesting that some organizations may employ internal compliance structures primarily as a
window-dressing mechanism that provides both market legitimacy
and reduced organizational liability for agent misconduct.
Part V explains that, rather than an effective system for deterring organizational misconduct, the U.S. legal regime may have
adopted a costly “safe harbor” that allows organizations to evade li-
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ability for organizational misconduct, so long as they have adopted
internal compliance structures.5 I then explore some possible reasons
for the legal regime’s extreme reliance on internal compliance structures in assessing organizational culpability, despite their poor empirical showing as a means of reducing organizational misconduct.
Although it is of course possible that the legal regime’s enthusiastic
embrace of internal compliance-based organizational liability is attributable to a simple misplaced faith in the effectiveness of internal
compliance structures in deterring organizational misconduct, this
Article suggests that the answer is likely far more complicated and
may be due to two factors.
First, it is possible that the legal regime’s embrace of internal
compliance structures is partly attributable to an over-reliance on
agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct. In other
words, if the legal regime presumes that organizational misconduct is
simply a principal-agent problem, legal incentives that induce principals to more carefully police their agents may be a rational response
to that perceived problem.
Second, public choice theory may explain some aspects of the
legal regime’s dependence on internal compliance structures as an
organizational liability determinant. As discussed in this Article, although the implementation of comprehensive internal compliance
structures is costly to organizations, it is far less costly than actually
altering current business practices. As a result, once public outcry
makes regulation inevitable, organizations may settle, or even push,
for a legal regime that incorporates internal compliance structures
into organizational liability determinations. In addition, other powerful interest groups have a stake in and benefit from internal compliance-based liability regimes, particularly legal compliance professionals such as lawyers, compliance and ethics consultants, in-house
compliance and human resources personnel, and diversity trainers.
Part VI briefly addresses the possibility of holding board
members and senior management vicariously liable for the misdeeds
of lower-level agents and warns that such liability is unlikely to effectively substitute for organizational liability. Part VII concludes.

5.

Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82
Wash. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (querying why corporate interests have not lobbied for such a safe harbor
from criminal liability).
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II. THE CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME
This Part outlines the three basic organizational liability standards for agent misconduct-- strict vicarious liability, negligence, and
composite liability--and the benefits and drawbacks of each.6 I demonstrate that duty-based liability regimes that look to the presence of
internal compliance structures to determine whether the organization
has met its duty of care are likely to fail, because courts lack reliable
information regarding the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, strict vicarious liability with some modifications to encourage
reporting and cooperation with government investigations is superior
to both negligence-based and composite liability systems in deterring
organizational misconduct and in inducing the appropriate level and
type of internal enforcement measures.
A. Strict Vicarious Liability
Under a strict vicarious liability standard, organizational liability is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes some punishable harm, regardless of any attempts by the organization to avoid
the harm.7 The premise behind strict vicarious liability is that, by
forcing organizations to internalize all of the costs associated with
their activities, the organization’s products are appropriately priced
and the socially optimal amount of the good or service is produced.8
In addition, strict vicarious liability systems may force the
adoption of the socially optimal level of internal organizational enforcement and deterrence mechanisms (internal compliance struc6.

It is generally recognized that some type of firm-level liability is necessary in order to effectively deter organizational misconduct for a variety of reasons, including the limited assets of organizational agents, the superior ability of firm-level liability to force the internalization of the costs of harmful activity, and the potential savings in enforcement costs. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 687, 692 (1997) (arguing that firm-level liability addresses problems of judgment-proof agents and
costly government sanctioning); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal
Stud. 319, 322 (1996) (arguing that firm-level liability saves on enforcement costs because, “[r]ather
than having to invest resources to penetrate the corporate hierarchy and decision-making structure to determine the culpability of particular individuals, the state can simply penalize the firm”). However,
many scholars debate whether this liability should ever take the form of criminal, as opposed to civil or
administrative, sanctions. See Fischel & Sykes, supra, at 322. In addition, cogent arguments can be
made that vicarious liability of senior officers and directors for organizational misconduct is, under
some circumstances, a useful complement to or substitute for organizational liability in deterring organizational misconduct. See infra Part VI (discussing this argument).
7.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the organization may be held liable for the acts of its
agents undertaken with an intent to benefit the organization that are within the ordinary scope of the
agent’s employment. I refer to such agents as “organizational actors” in this Article.
8.
Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 321-22; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top
Management Matter?, 91 Geo. L.J. 1215, 1223-24 (2003).
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tures). This is because when an organization bears all of the costs of
any harm it causes, it has an incentive to reduce the incidence of such
harm up to the point where the costs of such reduction equal the
benefits.9
Despite these advantages, strict vicarious liability systems
have been criticized on a number of fronts for creating incentives at
odds with the goal of deterring organizational misconduct. For example, some internal compliance structures, known as “policing measures,” may increase the probability of detection, either because information regarding the occurrence of misconduct may be reported to
government authorities by the organization or a whistleblower or because the government may subpoena any information regarding organizational misconduct that has been internally generated. Accordingly, it has been argued that, under a strict vicarious liability system,
organizations have an incentive to avoid implementing internal compliance structures that might reduce the incidence of organizational
wrongdoing.10 This results in increased levels of organizational misconduct and more expensive and less effective government policing
of such behavior.
In addition, some commentators argue that attempts to induce
internal organizational policing under strict vicarious liability regimes suffer from credibility problems. In other words, firms’ internal policing efforts will deter employee misconduct only if employees believe that firms will actually employ those efforts to detect, report, and punish such misconduct. Under a strict vicarious liability
system, it is argued, these threats are not credible because the firm itself will suffer increased liability from such efforts.11
These problems, however, are even more severe under dutybased organizational liability systems than under strict vicarious liability systems. As discussed in Parts II.B-C of this Article, due to the
informational disadvantages of courts and regulators regarding the effectiveness of internal policing measures, any duty-based organiza9.

Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 703; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 324 (arguing that
monitoring is desirable up to the point where the marginal cost would exceed the marginal social gain in
the form of reduced harmful activity).
10.
See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 840; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 708. Arlen and Kraakman distinguish “policing” measures that deter misconduct by increasing the probability of detection
from “preventive” measures that deter misconduct by altering the costs or benefits of misconduct but do
not impact the probability of detection. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 701-02. Examples of preventive measures include the firm’s compensation and promotion policies, strict controls over cash disbursements, and strict accounting for chemical waste. Id. According to Arlen and Kraakman, strict vicarious liability causes perverse incentive problems with respect to policing measures but not preventive
measures. Id. at 707.
11.
Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 712-714.
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tional liability system produces perverse incentives of its own. Specifically, organizations have an incentive to invest in low-cost, potentially ineffective internal policing measures that fail to reduce organizational misconduct, yet nonetheless reduce organizational liability.
More disturbing, the analysis of the empirical evidence in Part IV of
this Article suggests that many firms have adopted exactly this cosmetic approach to organizational compliance. Furthermore, employees are keenly aware of the extent to which such policing measures
are cosmetic, leading to potentially severe credibility problems in any
duty-based liability regime that relies on internal compliance structures in assessing guilt or sanctions.12
In addition, to the extent that policing and credibility concerns
are potential drawbacks of a strict vicarious liability system, these
drawbacks are surmountable and need not prevent the implementation of successful strict (or modified-strict) liability systems. Firms
can still be encouraged to engage in internal policing and cooperation
with government authorities through some combination of evidentiary privilege rules and reduced sanctions for cooperation with government investigations. In other words, firms can be rewarded, not
for the mere existence of internal compliance structures, but for ex
post demonstrations that such structures revealed useful information
that was then used to penalize those responsible for misconduct, thus
presumably deterring future misconduct.
First, fears that subsequent government or third-party access
to information produced by internal compliance structures will deter
the implementation of such structures can be addressed through privilege rules, such as those employed by many states in connection with
internal environmental and other audits.13 Similarly, attorney-client
privilege has been successfully invoked in some cases to shield cor12.

See, e.g., Ethics Resource Center, National Business Ethics Survey 31 (2003) (finding that
“[e]mployees who perceive that their supervisors do more than ‘talk about the importance of ethics’ observe less misconduct in their organizations”); Ethics Officer Association, The 2000 Member Survey
Report 30 (2000) (listing short term financial pressures, lack of financial or staff support, and compensation system inconsistent with corporate values as three of the top four principal obstacles to the work of
ethics officers); Marshall Clinard, Corporate Ethics and Crime: The Role of Middle Management 13236 (1983) (concluding from interviews with 64 retired managers of Fortune 500 corporations that the
behavior and philosophy of top management was most commonly asserted as the primary reason for illegal employee behavior); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Managerial Commitments, External Pressures, Corporate Ethical Practices, 42(5) Academy of
Mgmt. J. 539, 547 (1999) (finding that top management commitment to ethical behavior is more important in deterring misconduct than are external forces, such as the OSGS, which tend to promote only
formal changes, such as the adoption of ethics codes, that are not fully integrated into organizational activities).13
David Markert, Nicole Devero, & Brendan Donahue, Environmental Crimes, 41 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 443, 461-62 (2004) (discussing environmental, attorney-client, and other privileges designed to
protect internal corporate audits).
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porate audits from discovery and disclosure.14 In other words, rules
mandating that any information produced through internal policing
measures will not be used against the organization, provided that the
organization cooperates with any government investigation, could alleviate this concern and improve the deterrence function of strict liability.15
The proper role of privilege in organizational policing and enforcement is subject to much debate. The use of such privileges
doubtless raises concerns of its own, and may be more appropriate or
practical in connection with some types of violations than others.16
The point here, however, is that the most commonly advocated substitute for audit privileges – duty-based organizational liability re17
gime – presents even greater problems.
Fears that firms will fail to implement internal policing measures under a strict vicarious liability system can be further alleviated
through rules that reward organizations for post-offense reporting and
cooperation. For example, if organizations are offered reduced penalties in exchange for self-detection and reporting, the incentive to implement policing measures under a strict liability regime may be substantially increased. In fact, such reduced penalties in exchange for
self-reporting and cooperation already exist under the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines and also are employed informally in connection with many investigations and prosecutions of organizational
misconduct.18
14

Id.

15.

Professors Arlen and Kraakman refer to this version of modified strict liability as “probabilityfixed strict liability,” and argue that it is unworkable in both practice and theory. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 719-21. As a practical matter, they argue that modified strict liability is unworkable because it is not “truly possible to insulate a firm from the liability effects of its own policing efforts.” Id.
at 720. However, evidentiary privileges such as these are successfully used throughout criminal law to
prevent government authorities from accessing certain information. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, et al.,
Criminal Procedure §§9.1-9.6 (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree and other exclusionary rules of
criminal procedure). As a theoretical matter, Arlen and Kraakman argue that it would require prohibitively large sanctions in order to induce firms to police against low-visibility misconduct. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 720. However, this is true as a practical matter with respect to duty-based organizational liability regimes as well.
16
See, e.g., Steven A. Herman, NCSL Study Finds That State Environmental Audit Laws Have
No Impact on Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, 13 Nat'l Envtl. Enforcement J. 18,
19 (Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999)(finding that more than three-fourths of companies surveyed report performing
audits without regard to the existence of audit laws, but that most also fail to report violations, even
when the state provides an audit privilege); David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives Of Environmental
Audit Immunity, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 969 (1996) (discussing the debate over these privileges).
17
See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, When Companies Come Clean: Mitigation is
Better Than Environmental Audit Privileges, 9-FEB Bus. L. Today 46 (2000) (arguing that a compliance-based organizational liability regime is preferable to the use of internal audit privileges).
18.

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(g) (2004) [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines] (listing organizational cooperation in the investigation and voluntary self-reporting of the offense
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In short, the problems identified by commentators in connection with a strict vicarious liability regime are real, but are not insurmountable obstacles to an effective strict vicarious liability regime.
Several relatively minor changes to the current legal regime (some of
which have already been implemented with apparent success in certain regulatory settings), may alleviate many of the concerns expressed by critics of strict vicarious liability regimes. Finally, as detailed in Part II.C. below, internal compliance-based organizational
liability regimes pose similar, and arguably more severe, problems.
B. Negligence
Under a negligence-based organizational liability regime,
firm-level liability is imposed whenever an organizational actor
caused some punishable harm and the standard of due care was not
met. Typically, this means that the organization failed to take sufficient measures to avoid the harm; for example, it failed to implement
training programs or other internal compliance structures or to observe industry standards regarding operating methods.
Negligence-based organizational liability regimes are considered inferior to strict liability regimes in terms of encouraging the socially optimal level of production, because negligence-based organizational liability regimes do not force organizations to bear the entire
cost of their harmful conduct.19 Accordingly, goods and services produced by organizations in such a regime will be underpriced, and too
much will be produced.20
Furthermore, strict vicarious liability standards are considered
superior to negligence-based organizational liability standards in
terms of inducing the optimal level of internal compliance structures.
Although negligence-based liability could in theory induce the opti-

among several culpability factors); Memorandum Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, United States Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, January 20,
2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_ guidelines.htm (stating that, “[i]n determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate with the government's investigation may be relevant factors.”);
Shirah Neiman, Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview With United States Attorney James B. Comey
Regarding The Department Of Justice's Policy On Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investigation To Waive The Attorney Client Privilege And Work Product Protection, November 2003, United
States Attorney's Bulletin, 1456 PLI/Corp 1089 (2004)(discussing the role of corporate cooperation
with prosecutors in inducing leniency).
19.

See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 705; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 328;
Khanna, supra note 8, at 1226 (stating that “negligence standards tend to fail on the activity level front
because they do not force the firm to bear the full social costs of its products”); Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1980).
20.
Shavell, supra note 19, at 4.
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mal level of internal deterrence measures, it is unlikely to achieve
this goal in practice due to the difficulty of accurately determining
whether the standard of care has been met.
Judicial and agency determinations regarding whether a particular organization’s internal compliance structures meet the required standard of due care may be faulty for a variety of reasons.
First, courts and agencies may require either too many or too few
structures in setting the standard because they lack sufficient information to make such decisions accurately.21 As a result, they may
demand internal compliance structures whose costs exceed their deterrence benefits, resulting in social waste. Alternatively, they may
demand too few internal compliance structures, or internal compliance structures that are ineffective in deterring misconduct, resulting
in under-deterrence. Second, even assuming that courts and agencies
are able to accurately set the standard of care, they are likely to misjudge whether the organization has met that standard (in other words,
whether it has adopted the appropriate number and type of structures)
in the particular case at hand.22
Finally, courts and agencies are unlikely to possess the ability
to differentiate effective internal compliance structures from cosmetic
ones--that is, those structures designed to create the illusion of compliance for purposes of avoiding legal liability, rather than for the
purpose of deterring misconduct.23 This is because differentiating real
internal compliance structures from purely symbolic ones is a difficult task for legal decisionmakers, particularly ex post when, by definition, the structures in question have failed to deter misconduct. Additionally, the indicators of an effective internal compliance structure
are easily mimicked, and the true level of effectiveness is difficult for
any decisionmaker lacking perfect information to determine.24
This is not to imply that accurate determinations by courts
and agencies regarding whether internal compliance structures are
cosmetic or real are impossible. Presumably, given sufficient
amounts of time and money, reliable determinations as to the quality
of internal compliance could be made. However, as a society, we
have shown no willingness to dedicate the extraordinary resources to
21.

Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 329; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1227-28; Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487
(2003) (arguing that because legal decisionmakers are unable to determine this with any accuracy, internal compliance-based liability regimes tend to both under-deter misconduct and impose socially wasteful costs on organizations).
22.
Khanna, supra note 8, at 1228.
23.
See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 536-37.
24.
Id. at 491-92.
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courts, prosecutors, and agencies that would be necessary to perform
this function. Moreover, given the lower costs and greater effectiveness of an appropriately designed strict vicarious liability regime, this
refusal is probably wise.
C. Composite Regimes
Composite regimes are organizational liability regimes that
combine elements of both strict vicarious liability and negligence. In
its most common form, composite liability regimes assign liability
based on a strict liability standard but apportion sanctions based on a
negligence standard.25 Although the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines are typically offered as an example of such a regime, as
discussed in Part III of this Article, large segments of the United
States legal regime relating to organizational liability for agent misconduct are best characterized as composite regimes. Others, despite
their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious liability regimes, are actually negligence regimes, due to prosecutorial and agency discretion
and judicially-crafted exceptions to the strict vicarious liability rule.
Despite the popularity of composite regimes among legal
scholars and government actors, as discussed in Part IV of this Article, little evidence exists to support the theory that composite liability
regimes that incorporate organizational internal compliance structures into the sanction calculation deter organizational misconduct. In
fact, a growing body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of such regimes.
These results should not be entirely surprising. Composite regimes, at least in practice, present all of the same incentive problems
discussed in connection with negligence regimes. In other words,
negligence-based organizational liability regimes are criticized for a
failure to force organizations to fully internalize the costs of their
harmful activities. This same criticism, however, can be leveled at
composite regimes. Strict liability regimes, after all, only force the internalization of costs if the appropriate sanction is applied.26 By reducing the applicable sanctions based on a factor--the presence of internal compliance structures--unrelated to either the amount of harm
or the probability of detection, the composite regime moves away
from the optimal sanction, reducing the extent to which the sanc25.

Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 717 (referring to such regimes as “mixed liability re-

gimes”).

26.

This optimal sanction is equal to the harm caused divided by the probability of detection. See
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given
the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1993).
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tioned organization is forced to internalize the costs of its harmful
conduct.27
In addition, negligence-based organizational liability regimes
are criticized for, at least in practice, failing to provide incentives for
the adoption of the optimal level and type of internal compliance
structures. This same criticism, however, can and should be leveled at
composite regimes. As under the negligence-based regime, courts and
agencies may err in setting the standard by including too few, too
many, or an inappropriate type of internal compliance structure in the
due care standard. Furthermore, because courts and agencies lack
sufficient information regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures, they are likely to err in determining whether a particular organization has met the standard in any given case and, in
any event, are unlikely to possess the ability to differentiate symbolic
or cosmetic compliance structures, designed primarily to avoid liability rather than to deter misconduct, from genuine ones.28
III. UNITED STATES LAW AS A COMPOSITE LIABILITY REGIME
This Part demonstrates that, although the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) are correctly held out as the paradigm of a
composite liability regime, large and important segments of United
States law are best characterized as composite regimes.29 Others, despite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious liability regimes,
are actually negligence regimes due to prosecutorial and agency enforcement discretion and judicially-crafted exceptions from the strict
vicarious liability standard. In both cases, the determination of
whether the organization has met the standard of due care is determined by reference to the presence of internal compliance structures.
27.

Presumably, composite regimes that reward organizations for the presence of internal compliance structures do so on the assumption that such structures increase the probability of detection, and legal scholars defend composite regimes on exactly this basis. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 733. As
discussed in Part IV of this Article, however, when internal compliance structures are cosmetic, rather
than real, and legal decisionmakers are unable to tell the difference, internal compliance structures cannot be expected to reduce misconduct or increase the probability of detection.
28.
Krawiec, supra note 21, at 541 (arguing that not only are courts unable to make this distinction
but that a review of the case law demonstrates that, in many cases, they do not even try).
29
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal sentencing guidelines should be
interpreted by judges as merely advisory, rather than mandatory, to avoid violating criminal defendants’
Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Although it is unclear how this
ruling will impact organizational sentencing, many corporate lawyers are advising clients to continue
treating the OSGs as if they were mandatory. Guy Fields, Ruling on Sentencing Guidelines May Also
Affect Corporate Crime, Wall St. J. A4 (Jan. 17, 2005) (quoting one corporate counsel as stating that,
“as far as corporations are concerned, the compliance guidelines are not advisory, they are still mandatory.”)
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Part III.A of this Article defines the term “internal compliance structures” and illustrates the type of internal compliance structures that
are most prevalent in United States organizations. Part III.B describes
the role of these internal compliance structures in the U.S. legal regime by characterizing a broad array of laws as either composite or
negligence-based liability regimes that incorporate internal compliance structures into the organizational due care assessment.
A. Internal Compliance Structures Defined
The internal compliance structures adopted by most organizations are quite similar and are based primarily on two legal sources:
the minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system set
out in the OSGs30 and equal employment opportunity (EEO) law.31
For example, the centerpiece of any internal compliance program is a
written ethics or conduct code that sets forth the ostensible limits of
acceptable agent conduct.32 Most large organizations also have written EEO policies that confirm the organization’s commitment to nondiscriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion policies. Many conduct
and EEO codes also detail mechanisms of code enforcement, such as
internal reporting and information gathering procedures, policies regarding the investigation of reported violations, whistleblowing procedures and policies regarding the protection of whistleblowers from
retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct code
violations.33
Second, effective internal compliance requires that conduct
and EEO codes be communicated to the organization’s employees
and other agents. Common mechanisms for such dissemination in30.

Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the
Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. Bus. Ethics 367, 370 (2002).
31.
EEO law includes a variety of statutes, rules, and regulations addressing workplace discrimination. The most important of these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2000), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000), the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000), the rules, regulations and interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a variety of state statutes. See Elizabeth
Chamblis & Lauren B. Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal Employment Law, in Law’s Disciplinary Encounters: Readings in Law and Social Science (Victoria Saker Woeste et al. eds., forthcoming U. of Chicago Press, 2003).
32.
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1. Over ninety percent of Fortune 500 corporations and over seventy-five percent of other large corporations report having an ethics or conduct code.
Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15
Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 21, 21 (1996); Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid1990’s: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. Bus. Ethics 283 (1999).
33.
Brien, supra note 32, at 21; Richard S. Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for Evaluating
Compliance Programs: Insights from EEO Litigation, in 1 Corporate Compliance 2002, at 159, 169
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1317, 2002).
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clude training programs, organization newsletters, employee manuals, and organizational websites.34 In the EEO context, this communication often takes the form of “diversity” or harassment training.
Third, organizations must have monitoring and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by organizational agents.35 Fourth, most organizational compliance programs
contain a reporting mechanism that allows employees to report violations of the organization’s conduct code or of laws and regulations
without fear of retaliation by others within the organization.36 This
includes internal grievance procedures designed to allow employees
to express concerns regarding discriminatory conduct. Finally, specific, high-level personnel within the organization must be assigned
responsibility for oversight of compliance with the organization’s
conduct or ethics code.37
B. Internal Compliance Structures and Organizational Due Care
As widely noted, the OSGs in many ways represent the prototypical composite liability regime. For all practical purposes, the
OSGs require organizations to adopt internal compliance structures
by reducing to as little as one-twentieth or increasing by as much as
four hundred percent the original base fine faced by organizations
convicted of a federal crime based on a variety of mitigating or aggravating factors, including the presence of organizational internal
compliance structures.38 Assuming the absence of any aggravating
factors, such as involvement in the violation by high-level personnel,
the presence of “effective” internal compliance structures will result
in a reduction of the organization’s fine by up to sixty percent.39
34.

See Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
37.
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists as minimum
steps for an effective internal compliance system requirements that the organization use due care not to
delegate authority to agents with a propensity for illegal conduct, that the organization take all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the violation and prevent future similar violations once the offense
is discovered, and that the code of conduct be consistently enforced. Id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(3), (6), (7).
38.
Other culpability factors include tolerance of or participation in the violations by high-level
personnel, the organization’s prior history of similar misconduct, organizational cooperation in the investigation, voluntary self-reporting of the offense, and whether the organization accepted responsibility
for the illegal conduct. Id. § 8C2.5.
39.
Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, effective internal compliance structures are those that are “reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [they] generally [will be] effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the
instant offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective.” Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
The manual goes on to list the minimum steps that the organization must have taken in order to qualify
for a reduced sentence. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the minimum steps).
35.
36.
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Because the OSGs were one of the first major legal regimes
to make the transition from strict vicarious liability to an internal
compliance-based standard, they are an extraordinarily important
segment of the internal compliance-based legal regime. However, the
OSG internal compliance-based approach to organizational misconduct was quickly emulated in other legal fields. As a result, today a
wide variety of civil, criminal, and regulatory provisions encourage
the adoption of internal compliance structures through duty-based vicarious liability regimes.
For example, both the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) incorporate the OSG composite liability concept by allowing reduced
civil penalties and, in some cases, no criminal penalties for organizations with effective internal compliance structures.40 Furthermore, the
HHS guidelines for determining the existence of an effective internal
compliance program are fashioned directly after the OSGs’ minimum
steps for an effective compliance program.41 In addition, the Justice
Department follows what amounts to a negligence-based organizational liability regime that considers organizations’ internal compliance structures in deciding whether to criminally charge organizations for the acts of their employees and agents.42 Similarly, state attorneys general follow a negligence approach by considering organizational internal compliance structures in making enforcement decisions.43
The judiciary has also employed compliance-based liability
standards in a variety of legal contexts that amount to the creation of
a negligence-based organizational liability regime. For example, internal compliance structures may be relevant to a determination of
whether an employee’s illegal or tortious conduct was undertaken
with an intent to benefit the organization and thus determine organ40.

Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations,
65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of policy); see also Office of Inspector General, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Fraud Prevention and Detection: Compliance Guidance, at
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) [hereinafter HHS Guidelines] (providing links to compliance program guidance for, among others, pharmaceutical manufacturers, ambulance suppliers, nursing facilities, and hospitals).
41.
See HHS Guidelines, supra note 40. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS has also required the adoption of internal compliance structures by organizations settling health care fraud charges.
See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care Compliance
Programs, 6 Annals Health L. 51, 56 (1997).
42. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last updated Mar. 9,
2000).
43.
Junda Woo, Self-Policing Can Pay Off For Companies, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at B5.
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izational civil punitive or criminal liability. Organizations may be
able to demonstrate that an employee’s conduct was not undertaken
with an intent to benefit the organization through evidence that the
organizational defendant had in place ethics codes prohibiting the
relevant conduct and compliance programs ostensibly designed to detect violations.44
Corporate and securities law also contain elements of composite or negligence-based organizational liability regimes that provide an incentive for the adoption of internal compliance structures.
Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act, for example, authorizes the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of any broker/dealer that “has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to
preventing violations of the provisions of [the securities or commodities laws], another person who commits such a violation, if such
other person is subject to his supervision.”45 This requirement is
deemed met so long as procedures reasonably designed to detect and
prevent violations have been implemented.46
The Delaware corporate law approach to claims that a board
of directors has failed to adequately monitor the corporation’s employees and activities closely resembles an internal compliance-based
approach to liability by holding directors liable for a breach of the
duty of care when a failure to implement internal compliance structures results in organizational misconduct.47 Although this liability
risk may be slight, it appears that corporate boards--at the urging of

44.

See, e.g., United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that “a corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but that
the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee
in fact acted to benefit the corporation”); In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527990,
at *2 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995) (upholding jury instructions that “you must consider whether the actions
of employees were in violation of direct . . . policies of the defendant corporations”).
45.
15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000).
46.
Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i). Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity Exchange Act and in
the Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) rules. See, e.g., NASD Conduct Rule 3010, National Association of Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) 4831 (2004) (requiring NASD members to establish and
maintain a system to supervise employees); NYSE Rule 342.21, 2 New York Stock Exchange Guide
(CHH) ¶ 2342 (2004) (requiring that trades be subjected to review procedures); Chi. Bd. Options Exch.
Rules 4.2, 9.8, Chicago Board Options Exchange Guide (CCH) ¶¶ 2082, 2308 (2004); 17 C.F.R. §
166.3 (2000). See generally, Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. Corp. L. 267 (2004) (discussing the diffusion of internal controls, particularly in the financial fraud area).
47.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that in
order to receive business judgment rule protection, directors must “exercise a good faith judgment that
the corporation’s information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the board
that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations”).
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legal professionals--may have overestimated the risk of personal liability.48
However, the legal arena that arguably has most ardently embraced the composite and negligence-based organizational liability
approach and, consequently, has had the greatest impact on the adoption of internal compliance structures is EEO law, especially the law
governing workplace harassment. EEO law incorporates standards of
organizational due care into organizational liability determinations in
at least three ways.
First, internal compliance structures (especially EEO hiring,
promotion, and termination policies; grievance procedures; and diversity education programs) may operate as a defense against punitive damages in claims of intentional discrimination by allowing organizations to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO
law.49 Although in many cases the defendant’s compliance structures
have been found inadequate to insulate the employer from punitive
damages, other defendants have managed to successfully invoke their
internal compliance structures as a shield against punitive damages.50
Second, the employer’s EEO-related internal compliance
structures may be examined--along with other circumstantial evidence--to determine whether the employer harbored discriminatory
intent.51 In other words, because employers today rarely leave a
“smoking gun” that plaintiffs can invoke to demonstrate overt animus, plaintiffs and defendants alike may rely on circumstantial evi48.

Because “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight” such as “an
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists” leads to director
liability, the risk of personal liability to directors is probably slight. Id. at 971. Corporate boards, however, seem to treat the risk as real. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards:
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797,
819-20 (2001) (arguing that boards of directors have overestimated the threat of personal liability under
Caremark).
49.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that employers who are able to
demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law may avoid punitive damages for the discriminatory acts of agents acting within the scope of their employment).
50.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a hospital could not be liable to African-American employees for punitive damages because the
hospital undertook wide-spread antidiscrimination efforts, including its creation of a hospital-wide antidiscrimination policy and its implementation of a grievance policy and diversity training program; thus,
it could not be vicariously liable for its managerial employees’ discriminatory decisions); Jaudon v.
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 172 (D. Md. 2000) (finding that the defendant employer had
demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with Title VII because it had “published, maintained, and
distributed sexual harassment, open door, and equal opportunity policies”).
51.
Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1749, 1789-92 (1990) (discussing the unsuccessful use at trial of evidence of internal compliance structures, especially affirmative action policies, to establish the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination
cases).
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dence, including the presence or lack of EEO hiring, promotion, and
termination policies, diversity training, and the like, in order to demonstrate or disprove intentional discrimination.
Finally, the employer’s internal compliance structures may be
relevant to a determination of liability in any hostile environment
harassment claim, especially supervisor hostile environment harassment of which the employer was unaware.52 Employers face liability
for hostile environment harassment under three different standards.
First, for coworker hostile environment harassment, the employer is
judged under a negligence standard and is liable for all harassment of
which it knew or should have known and negligently failed to correct. Antiharassment policies, employee training designed to prevent
harassment, and formal harassment complaint procedures may all
constitute evidence that the employer was not negligent in failing to
discover the harassment.53 Similarly, these same EEO-compliance
structures may be employed to demonstrate that, despite the plaintiff
employee’s complaints of harassment, knowledge cannot be imputed
to the employer.54
Second, with regard to supervisor hostile environment harassment of which the employer was aware, the employer may be held
liable for its own negligence in failing to properly respond to the harassment. The implementation of internal grievance procedures, anti52.

Hostile environment harassment occurs when the employer’s behavior is so severe or pervasive that, although there is no tangible harm, such as job loss or decreased pay, the behavior nonetheless
alters the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The Supreme Court has also recognized “tangible employment actions,”
which involve “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits,” made on the basis of the employee’s membership in any Title VII protected class. Id. at 761.
Because the employer faces strict liability for all tangible employment actions, id. at 762-63, however,
the employer’s internal compliance structures should not be relevant to a finding of liability in tangible
employment actions.
53.
See, e.g., Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999) (stating that an
employer must provide an avenue for complaints in order to avoid liability for a negligent failure to
know of existing harassment); Velez v. City of New Jersey, 817 A.2d 409, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2003) (holding that “an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment under a theory of negligence
based upon ‘its failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective
formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms’” (quoting Lehmann
v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993))).
54.
See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that because the employer’s well-publicized harassment policy specified the proper channels
for harassment complaints and the plaintiff did not follow those channels, knowledge of the plaintiff’s
harassment could not be imputed to the defendant employer); Giuliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589,
595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“When companies institute written policies established to deal intelligently
with allegations of sexual harassment, it is more likely that management will be informed of any impropriety occurring within the company. Companies that fail to institute such policies will naturally find
themselves vulnerable to the likelihood that knowledge will be imputed to them.”).
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harassment policies, and diversity training may all constitute evidence of a proper response to the harassment.55
The cases in which the employer’s harassment policies and
procedures will be most relevant, however, are cases of supervisor
hostile environment harassment of which the employer was unaware.
In such cases, the employer is held vicariously liable unless it can establish a two-part affirmative defense: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”56
In adopting the two-pronged affirmative defense, the Supreme
Court declined to require antiharassment policies and compliance
procedures as a matter of law and never stated that such policies,
standing alone, are sufficient to insulate employers from liability for
supervisor hostile environment harassment. The Court did, however,
highlight the importance of antiharassment policies and internal
complaint procedures in establishing the first prong of the defense,
stating that
[w]hile proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated
policy suitable to the employment circum55.

See, e.g., Smith v. First Union National Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating
that "[a]n employer's adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in determining whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent any sexually harassing behavior."); Brown v. Perry,
184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if "there is no evidence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer 'exercised reasonable care to prevent' and promptly correct sexual harassment."); Idusuyi v. State of Tennessee Dept. of Children's Services, 2002 WL 220640, at *4 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the employer was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense because it had a policy prohibiting
sexual harassment, a complaint procedure that the plaintiff failed to use, and a two-hour training session
on sexual harassment); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp.2d 328, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment because it had adopted
an anti-harassment policy and a complaint procedure, "the Code of Conduct and Open Door Policy.").
56.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764
(adopting the same standard). The second prong of the Supreme Court’s test has been criticized at length
by legal commentators and social scientists, who argue that victims of sexual harassment rarely utilize
internal complaint procedures for a variety of reasons that are entirely reasonable. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment--Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 169, 181-85
(2001) (noting that survey data reveals that only two to fifteen percent of sexual harassment victims utilize employers’ internal complaint procedures for reasons that include the following: beliefs that informal
avenues are more effective; fear of blame, retaliation, or not being believed; and concerns regarding the
effectiveness of internal complaint procedures).
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stances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense.57
Many lower courts, however, seem to have gone much further, treating EEO-related internal compliance structures as both necessary and sufficient conditions for liability avoidance. For example,
some lower courts have treated antiharassment policies and internal
complaint procedures as in-and-of-themselves legally sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the employer’s attempts to prevent or
correct harassment.58 Similarly, many lower courts have seemed to
treat internal compliance structures as a necessary condition for liability avoidance, ruling that employers without such structures cannot establish the affirmative defense.59
Although the true extent to which EEO-related internal compliance structures result in systematic differences in the rate and
amount of employer liability is an empirical question that has not
fully been answered, two points are clear.60 First, legal compliance
professionals have cleverly, but predictably, packaged EEO internal
compliance structures into absolute necessities for employers hoping
to avoid huge liabilities.61 Second, there has been an increasing em57.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if “there is no evidence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of a
conclusion that the employer ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent’ and promptly correct sexual harassment” (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 328,
341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment
because it had adopted an antiharassment policy and a complaint procedure). See also, Susan BisomRapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 125, 141 (discussing the role of harassment training in lower court decisions after Ellerth and Faragher) (hereafter, Bisom-Rapp, Watches).
59.
See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, as a matter of law, that
defendant employer “could never show that it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any harassing behavior” because “it had no policy specifically aimed at sexual harassment,”
only a nondiscrimination policy).
60.
Lauren Edelman provides some evidence on this point in an empirical study conducted shortly
after the decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, which replaced the existing standard of strict vicarious liability with a duty-based liability standard. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72
(1986). At the time of the study, only 116 cases had been decided since the Meritor decision. Edelman
et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 134 at 440. Of those 116, 91% indicated that a well-crafted internal
grievance procedure would insulate the employer from liability and in 36% of the cases the employer’s
grievance procedures did insulate the company from liability. Id. Furthermore, Edelman found that
courts were becoming increasingly willing to defer to employers’ grievance procedures when assessing
liability. Id. At 442. If true, the percentage of cases in which the employer’s EEO internal compliance
structures provide insulation from liability could be much higher today.
61.
See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 33, at 163 (stating that “the liability standards in the EEO field . .
. make compliance program quality the key to reducing certain forms of employer liability”); Ellen
58.
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phasis during litigation on the employer’s internal compliance structures, with plaintiffs’ lawyers and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission seeking to determine how much money the employer has spent on such structures, the content of training sessions,
and the expertise of diversity trainers and human resources personnel.62
IV. DETERRENCE UNDER INTERNAL COMPLIANCE-BASED
LIABILITY REGIMES
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence regarding the role of internal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct
provides little reason to approach with enthusiasm the U.S. legal system’s movement to internal compliance-based organizational liability
regimes. Surprisingly little empirical evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring organizational misconduct -- a disturbing fact given the legal regime’s heavy
reliance on such structures as a liability determinant. Even more disturbing, however, is the fact that the evidence that does exist is decidedly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodologically
sound studies finding no significant correlation between the most
widely-used internal compliance structures and reduced organizational misconduct.
This Part analyzes the empirical evidence regarding three
types of internal compliance structures on which the United States
legal regime places special reliance: ethics or conduct codes, the
OSG-recommended internal compliance structures, and diversity or
harassment training. As will be shown, there is insufficient empirical
evidence to conclude that any of these mechanisms deter organizational misconduct.
A. Ethics Codes
Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate America and the importance ascribed to them by the U.S. legal regime, little evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes modify employee behavior. Although some studies do find a significant relationship between ethics codes and employee conduct, they are plagued
McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid Liability, Nat’l L.J., Jan.
29, 2001, at B10 (“[E]ngaging in quality training in conjunction with a well-written policy will likely
translate into successfully meeting the good-faith defense of Kolstad.”); Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra
note 58 at 139 (quoting training advocates and attorneys as stating that Ellerth and Faragher require
harassment training and that such training will insulate employers from liability).
62.
McLaughlin & Merchasin, supra note 61.
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with methodological problems, such as a failure to query respondents
on or identify modified behavior due to ethics codes (as opposed to
merely asking respondents whether they believe that ethics codes are
an important factor affecting behavior), a reliance on hypothetical dilemmas in lab settings (as opposed to observing actual conduct in an
employment setting), and a sole reliance on self-reporting.63
Furthermore, these findings are contradicted by a large number of studies finding no significant relationship between ethics codes
and employee conduct.64 Typical of these is a recent study in which
respondents were unable to provide specific examples of instances in
which employees had altered their behavior due to ethics codes,
overwhelmingly indicated that their employers’ conduct codes had
not altered their conduct, and asserted that they had never referred to
their employers’ conduct codes.65
Of course, ethics codes are only one type of internal compliance structure and, moreover, are a very superficial one. Perhaps researchers have been unable to document a link between ethics codes
and ethical conduct because supporting compliance structures, such
as those required by the OSGs, are necessary to deter organizational
misconduct.
B. The OSGs
Unfortunately, very little research has attempted to verify
whether the assumption underlying the OSGs (that internal compli63.

See, e.g., Alan Kitson, Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank, 15 J. Bus.
Ethics 1021 (1996) (interviews with seventeen bank managers); Donald L. McCabe et al., The Influence
of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on Ethics-Related Behavior in the Workplace, 6 Bus.
Ethics Q. 461 (1996) (questionnaire to 328 college graduates); Margaret Anne Pierce & John W. Henry,
Computer Ethics: The Role of Personal, Informal, and Formal Codes, 15 J. Bus. Ethics 425 (1996)
(questionnaire responses from 356 data-processing management professionals).
64.
See, e.g., Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical Consulting Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional Values, 12 J. Bus. Ethics 449 (1993) (questionnaire survey of 207 national business consultants); Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business
Ethics: A View from the Trenches, 37 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 8 (1995) (interviews with thirty middle managers); Arthur P. Brief et al., What’s Wrong with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J.
Bus. Ethics 183 (1996) (questionnaires and experiment with nearly 400 executives and controllers);
Victor J. Callan, Predicting Ethical Values and Training Needs in Ethics, 11 J. Bus. Ethics 761 (1992)
(questionnaires from 226 state government employees); Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard,
Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 619 (1998) (questionnaires from
150 graduate and undergraduate business students). However, many of these studies suffer from the
same methodological problems that beset those studies finding a significant relationship between ethics
codes and employee conduct.
65.
M. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. Bus. Ethics 247, 253 (2001) (concluding that although ethics codes may have the potential to
alter employee behavior, “this appears to take place on very rare occasions”).
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ance structures such as those recommended in the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual reduce the incidence of organizational misconduct) withstands empirical testing. In fact, only three large-scale studies seek systematically to test the assumptions of the OSG recommendations.66 None of the studies supported the hypothesis that the
OSG-recommended internal compliance structures deter illegal conduct.
Indeed, two of the studies found unanticipated positive correlations between internal compliance structures and legal violations.
The study authors attributed these findings to the possibility that internal compliance structures, such as those recommended by the
OSGs, may serve primarily a window-dressing function designed
only to reduce legal liability.67
C. Diversity and Harassment Training
Finally, due to Supreme Court and lower court interpretations
of EEO law, diversity training (including harassment training) has
become an increasingly common type of internal compliance structure. A 1998 study by the Society for Human Resource Management,
for example, found that seventy-five percent of Fortune 500 firms
and thirty-six percent of other firms have a diversity training program
of some sort.68
Nonetheless, there is little empirical support for the proposition that diversity training reduces discriminatory conduct. In a recent
working paper, Katerina Bezrukova and Karen Jehn of the Wharton
School reviewed twenty empirical studies published in major man66.

See M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior, in 9 Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 107, 125 (W. Frederick ed., 1987) (examining the
incidence of civil and administrative actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies against 485 corporations from 1973 through 1980 and concluding that “there is little relationship between codes of
conduct [and enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations”); McKendall et al., supra note 30 (a
longitudinal study finding that the presence of OSG-recommended compliance structures do not reduce
the incidence of OSHA violations); Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity,
Choice, and Corporate Illegality, 8 Org. Sci. 624 (1997).
67.
Mathews, supra note 66, at 125 (finding a positive correlation between certain aspects of conduct code content--such as codes that require compliance affidavits by employees or that mention
“maintaining the reputation of the corporation”--and the number of legal violations and concluding that
“perhaps executives at law-abiding corporations do not feel the need to convince others of their ‘good
reputation’”); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 380 (finding a positive correlation between the OSGrecommended internal compliance structures and the incidence of willful and repeat OSHA violations
and concluding that, because willful and repeat violations are the type most likely to include senior
management involvement or knowledge, organizations may be using the OSG-recommended internal
compliance structures to hide management involvement in, or reduce organizational liability for, purposeful illegal activity).
68.
Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Development Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 Organizational Dynamics 149, 149 (2001).
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agement, psychological, and sociological journals and concluded that
“[h]aving reviewed the available empirical studies on the effects of
diversity training programs in corporations and on campuses it is obvious that it is too soon to draw any comprehensive conclusions.”69
Although much of the empirical research reviewed by Professors
Bezrukova and Jehn identified improvements in diversity training
participants’ awareness of diversity issues,70 only one of the studies
documented sustained attitudinal or behavioral changes.71
Similarly, in the most comprehensive study of diversity training and other EEO compliance measures ever undertaken, Alexandra
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelley combine survey information
on affirmative action and diversity programs from 800 American employers with annual federal data on their workforce composition from
1971 to 1999. 72 As a general rule, organizations that implemented
diversity training programs did not significantly improve managerial
TP

69.

PT

Katerina Bezrukova & Karen A. Jehn, The Effects of Diversity Training Programs 16 (July
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
70.
Id. at 10-11; see also Heidi Tarr Henson, Gauging the Outcomes of Organizational Diversity
Implementations: The Intersection of Attitudes, Awareness and Behavior, 60 Dissertation Abstracts
Int’l 2325 (2000) (finding that diversity training achieved an awareness of diversity issues, but did not
result in attitudinal changes); Dick Wallace Kracht, Diversity Training Among Manufacturing Companies: Reaction and Learning in a For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Work Environment, 59 Dissertation Abstracts Int’l 2,345 (1999) (finding an increase in perceived learning among 141 employees after diversity training); Dana Yavette Law, An Evaluation of a Cultural Diversity Training Program, 59 Dissertation Abstracts Int’l 2,468 (1998) (finding improved awareness of diversity issues in training group
relative to control group); Jean A. Mausehund et al., Diversity Training: Effects of an Intervention
Treatment on Nonverbal Awareness, 58 Bus. Comm. Q. 27 (1995) (finding a positive link between diversity training and awareness of nonverbal factors in interpersonal communications between people
from different cultures); David L. Tan et al., Changes in Attitude After Diversity Training, 50 Training
& Dev. 54 (1996) (finding a significant increase in diversity awareness in 739 managers after diversity
training workshops).
71.
See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 69, at 11-13. Compare Taylor Cox, Jr., The Multicultural
Organization, 5 Executive 34, 45 (1991) (finding that “Race Relations Competence Workshops” resulted in more positive attitudes toward African Americans and better inter-race relations among workshop participants), with Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, What Makes Diversity Programs Work?, 39 H.R.
Mag. 67 (1994) (surveying 785 members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding
positive short-term impact of diversity training on attitudes but less positive long-term benefits); Diane
Marie Govern, The Effect of Diversity Awareness Training on Oral Presentation Ratings, 58 Dissertation Abstracts Int’l 5,681 (1998) (finding no correlation between diversity training and ratings of oral
presentations by black and white police sergeant candidates); Henson, supra note 70, at 2,325 (finding
no attitudinal change in respondents from diversity training). Bezrukova and Jehn reviewed five studies
that tested the impact of diversity training programs on college campuses. Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note
69, at 12. Three of the studies found a small positive correlation between diversity training and attitudes
toward ethnic minorities. However, the authors attributed this variation to self-selection bias, rather than
to a real change in attitudes. Id. at 12-13.
Further compromising the effectiveness of diversity training are two factors: first, the backlash
that may result; and, second, the attempt to “sterilize” diversity training sessions in anticipation of the
fact that statements made may be admitted as evidence during litigation.
72
Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Two to Tango: Affirmative Action, Diversity Programs and Women and African Americans in Management (working draft on file with the author).
TP

PT
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diversity and, in fact, tended to significantly decrease the odds of
women in management positions. 73 Although the authors did find
that some affirmative action and diversity measures (especially those
programs designed to “couple” rhetoric regarding diversity goals
with activities designed to promote diversity) had significant, positive impacts on the odds of women and minorities in management,
particularly at employers that are government contractors, they conclude that diversity measures designed to counter managerial bias,
including diversity training, are least effective. 74
In the end, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly conclude that at least
some types of EEO internal compliance structures can enhance diversity, if coupled with legal accountability. Their study demonstrates,
however, how much we have yet to learn about the impacts of EEO
compliance structures on different demographic groups and the circumstances under which even the most promising EEO compliance
structures can be expected to combat discrimination. In the rapid
move to internal compliance-based organizational liability, however,
such distinctions appear to have been uniformly ignored.
As extensively discussed by Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, the
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of sexual harassment
training is equally sparse. 75 As noted by two researchers in the field,
“[t]he unpleasant empirical truth is that almost nothing is known
TP

PT

TP

TP

73

PT

With respect to all employers, diversity training had a significant, negative impact on the odds
of black women in management positions and no significant impact on the odds of white women and
black men in management positions. Id. At 53, Table 2. When this data is broken down into the impact
of diversity training at government contractors (who are subject to affirmative action obligations) versus
non-contractors, however, diversity training is shown to negatively impact the odds of both white and
black women in management positions while failing to significantly impact the odds of black men. In
contrast, among employers that are government contractors, diversity training had a significant, positive
impact on the odds of white women in management positions, while failing to impact the odds of black
men or black women. Id. At 54, Table 3.
74
Id. at 37-38. Many diversity measures impacted different demographic groups differently. For
example, a program or measure might improve the odds of white women in management while at the
same time negatively impacting or failing to significantly impact the odds of black men in management.
Id. at 53-54, Tables 2 and 3. However, as a general rule, measures designed to combat the “decoupling”
of diversity rhetoric from action (such as affirmative action plans, diversity committees, and diversity
staff committees) enhanced managerial diversity more than did other measures. In addition, the effectiveness of different measures varied across type of employer: Diversity measures tended to be more effective at government contractors, who are subject to affirmative action obligations, than at noncontractors. Id.
75
Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58 at 142-44; Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is
a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and
Prevention In Employment Discrimination Law, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Disc. L. 101, 130-36 (2001)
(hereafter, Bisom-Rapp, Ounce); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967-976 (1999) (arguing that many employers adopt minimally disruptive symbolic compliance policies and procedures that
result in little, if any, substantive change in the employment environment).
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about the effects of sexual harassment education and training programs.” 76 Given the dearth of research on the effects of sexual harassment training, many social scientists are alarmed at the unwavering commitment of employers and compliance professionals to harassment training. 77
Moreover, the existing research on the effects of harassment
training fails to support the hypothesis that harassment training alters
employee conduct. Although some studies do support the notion that
harassment training increases trainees’ awareness of potential instances of harassment, many researchers doubt that the training has
long term effects on attitudes or behavior. 78
TP

PT
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TP
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D. Summary
In sum, the data regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance-based organizational liability regimes is both preliminary and
disturbing. First, the fact that the U.S. legal regime has so quickly
transitioned to internal compliance-based liability regimes based on
such limited and conflicting evidence is troubling. The existing studies are insufficient in number, methodology, and scope to warrant
such a move. Nonetheless, this trend should not be surprising, given
the political influence of those who benefit most from an internal
compliance-based liability regime--organizational defendants and the
legal compliance professionals who serve them.
Perhaps more importantly, the evidence that does exist regarding the effectiveness of internal compliance-based liability regimes
suggests that many types of widely-used internal compliance structures currently considered to demonstrate good faith organizational
attempts to comply with the law are ineffective at reducing organizational misconduct. Even the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study, which
concludes that EEO internal compliance structures can enhance EEO
compliance under some circumstances, demonstrates the dangers of
an ill-conceived internal-compliance based liability regime. If that
regime rewards organizations even for those compliance measures
that decouple compliance rhetoric from compliance activity or that
have been shown to be of limited effectiveness then such a regime
may fail to accomplish – and may even thwart – the goal of reducing
organizational misconduct.79
76

Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on Perceptions of
Sexual Harassment, 28 J. APPLIED SOC . PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (1998) (quoted in Bisom-Rapp, Watches,
supra note 58 at 142.)
77
Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58 at 142-143.
78
Id. at 123-24.
79
The Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study also demonstrates that even when internal compliance strucTP
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In short, given the theoretical problems inherent in internal
compliance-based liability regimes discussed in Part II of this Article
and the large and politically powerful interest groups that stand to
benefit from such a regime, defenders of the move to a internal compliance-based organizational liability systems should bear the burden
of proving the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct. The analysis of the available empirical evidence detailed in this Part indicates that this burden has not
been met.
V. EXPLAINING THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME
Why does the law place so much reliance on factors, such as
internal compliance structures, that appear to have little impact on the
incidence of organizational misconduct? This Part explores two possible explanations: (1) an over-reliance on principal-agent models of
organizational misconduct and (2) public-choice explanations.
A. Principal-Agent Models of Misconduct
One potential explanation for the legal regime’s heavy reliance on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant is an
over-reliance on principal-agent models of organizational misconduct.80 In other words, current legal theory largely assumes that misconduct within organizations results from the acts of single, independent agents who disregard the preferences of shareholder principals and their representatives--the board of directors and senior management.81 In the more sophisticated version of this argument, even
tures provide some positive results, they may be accompanied by unintended negative consequences.
For example, some diversity measures appeared to benefit one demographic group at the expense of another, although both groups were the ostensible beneficiaries of the measures. See Kalev, Dobbin, &
Kelly at 53-54, Tables 2-3. (finding that some diversity measures increase the odds of management positions for one minority demographic group, while decreasing it for one or more other minority demographic groups).
80.

See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 834 (“These agents are rational self-interested utility
maximizers who commit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own self-interest an
agent may commit a crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but this is not its purpose.”);
Kevin Huff, The Role Of Corporate Compliance Programs In Determining Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1252, 1288-89 (1996) (arguing that, “[c]ourts should
recognize,however, that corporate employees ‘are rational self-interested utility maximizers who commit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own self-interest an agent may commit a
crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but this is not its purpose.’”) (quoting Arlen, supra this
note); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 19, n.82 (2002) (criticizing the view of organizational
misconduct as the behavior of a single, errant agent).
81.

In the majority of large organizations in which organizational misconduct is detected, active
participation in or direct knowledge of the misconduct is rarely attributable to senior management and
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when misconduct is undertaken in order to enhance corporate profitability or performance, the primary motivation is to promote or safeguard the careers of the agents undertaking the misconduct.82
If the law over-relies on principal-agent models of organizational misconduct, then one can see why the legal system might place
too much emphasis on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant. If organizational misconduct is simply an agency cost
problem, then internal compliance structures--such as internal monitoring and reporting, employee training, and conduct codes--might
reduce such problems by increasing the ease with which shareholder
principals (through senior management and boards of directors) can
monitor employee and mid-level management agents.83
Unfortunately, however, organizational misconduct is much
more complicated than this. The simple principal-agent model of organizational misconduct embodied in much legal theory conflates the
concepts of what sociologists refer to as organizational misconduct-conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization--and
occupational misconduct--conduct undertaken solely to benefit the
perpetrator and from which the organization derives no benefit.84 Indeed, the organization may actually be the victim of occupational
misconduct, as in the case of embezzlement, for example.
Because the agent derives no direct benefit from organizational misconduct, the personal benefits from such actions must derive from increased pay, status, or job security because the misconduct in question at least contributes to the appearance of organizational profitability.85 Unless organizational agents systematically
miscalculate the probability that organizational misconduct will positively impact the bottom line, then, by definition, their conduct must
create real or apparent profits. Real profits in excess of real costs
will, of course, always benefit shareholder principals. In addition, the
even more rarely to the board of directors.
82.
Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 315, 319 (1991).
83.
By focusing on the costs and benefits of organizational misconduct to shareholders, I do not
mean to imply that other organizational stakeholders are unaffected by such actions. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent events at Enron and Arthur Anderson, often low-level employees, creditors, and other
stakeholders far removed from the misconduct in question are greatly harmed by organizational misconduct.
84.
See sources cited supra note 1 (defining organizational misconduct).
85.
See Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Key to Risk Management: Management, in Risk Management:
Challenge and Opportunity 103 (Michael Frenkel et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that the academic finance
and management literature has failed to develop a sufficient understanding of organizational misbehavior because it is overly focused on agency cost explanations when, in many of the most high-profile
misconduct examples, the agent’s incentives were aligned with those of his or her firm, at least in the
beginning).

ORGANIZATIONAL MISCONDUCT

29

creation of apparent profits will sometimes benefit shareholder principals. Therefore, as discussed below, the category of actions that
represent attempts to increase shareholder-principal welfare may be
larger than is typically assumed. These actions thus are not properly
characterized as principal-agent problems.
Specifically, a simple agency cost model of organizational
misconduct is incomplete in at least two ways. First, a model of organizational misconduct that treats agent misdeeds as the feat of a
lone individual actor ignores the role played by the organizational
system in shaping that conduct. Second, organizational misconduct
may benefit organizational profitability and performance (and thus
shareholder welfare) in subtle and difficult to quantify ways, meaning
that organizational management (even when acting as the loyal
agents of shareholder owners) may have reasons to tolerate such behavior that are not immediately obvious.86
1. Organizational Environment
For many years now, researchers who study human behavior
have been aware of the powerful role played by environment, including organizational environment, in shaping individual perceptions
and actions. Yet many legal scholars, and the legal system itself,
steadfastly ignore any responsibility by those who create that climate
for the acts of errant agents, except to the extent that other organizational actors were actually aware of or contributed to the misconduct.
Yet, senior management, through the organizational climate
that it creates, plays an important role in shaping agent conduct. Although senior management shapes the organizational environment
(and thus employee conduct) in many ways, at least three mechanisms have been extensively studied: organizational culture, incentive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to ethical
conduct.87 For example, a climate in which employees are encouraged to or rewarded for pursuing the bottom line even at the expense
of breaking laws or the company’s conduct code is more likely to
produce agents who violate laws and conduct codes.88 Similarly,
86.

Discuss empirical debate on profitability. (???)
Other individual (that is, personal values), organizational (for example, organization size, decentralization, and financial distress), and industry (for example, concentration) factors have also been
shown to impact organizational misconduct rates. See e.g., McKendall & Wagner, supra note 66 at 644
(finding that organizational size, structure, complexity, and industry concentration are significant factors
impacting the incidence of corporate illegality); McKendall et al., supra note 30 at 376 (finding that
lower firm profitability is positively associated with firm OSHA violations) and at 368 (discussing earlier studies that find illegal activity is more likely in firms facing financial pressure).
88.
See, e.g., Allen & Davis, supra note 64 at 449 (finding that corporate culture and reward systems--rather than ethics codes--impact employee behavior); Anita Jose & Mary S. Thibodeux, Institu87.

30

FLORIDA STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

lower level employees are likely to take their cues regarding what
behavior is acceptable from senior management and coworkers.
Agents who believe that management’s commitment to the observance of laws and organizational rules is symbolic rather than real are
more likely to disregard those laws and rules.89
Finally, the compensation and reward system employed by
management may greatly affect employee behavior. Rewards and
punishments that are performance-based and fail to properly account
for the method by which performance goals are attained are likely to
result in more violations than a reward and punishment system that
more carefully accounts for the means by which performance goals
are attained.90
I am not asserting that, as a general rule, organizational liability regimes should attempt to account for factors related to the incidence of organizational misconduct--such as organizational culture,
incentive and reward systems, and management’s commitment to
ethical actions--by directly incorporating them into liability, sanctioning, or prosecutorial determinations.91 Like determinations regarding
the effectiveness of internal compliance structures, an analysis of
these factors by legal decisionmakers is likely to be difficult, costly,
and fraught with errors.92 Nor am I attempting to exonerate culpable
tionalization of Ethics: The Perspectives of Managers, 22 J. Bus. Ethics 133, 139 (1999) (finding that
98.8% of managers surveyed ranked top management support and that 93% ranked corporate culture
above factors such as conduct codes and training programs as important in encouraging ethical corporate
conduct).
89.
See sources cited supra note 12 (discussing the importance of managerial attitudes and behavior in deterring organizational misconduct).
90.
Allen & Davis, supra note 64 at 449 (finding that organizational reward systems significantly impact employee behavior); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into The Responsibility Of
Corporations And Their Officers And Directors For Corporate Climate: The Psychology Of Enron's
Demise, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1, 34-40 (2003)(discussing organizational reward and compensation systems).
91.
Lawmakers have on several occasions demonstrated an awareness that factors such as organizational culture and reward systems may contribute to organizational misconduct. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 54 (2003) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Report] (urging organizations to “promote an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with the law”), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005); News Release, SEC, SEC
Chairman Levitt Receives Compensation Committee’s Report Highlighting Industry ‘Best Practices’;
Calls On Entire Industry to Review Closely (Apr. 10, 1995) (warning that the compensation system used
by many broker-dealers provides incentives to churn customer accounts and recommend unsuitable investments), available at 1995 WL 154267.
92.
There are likely to be some instances where the connection between organizational incentive
systems and organizational misconduct is quite clear. One commonly cited example is the complaint
brought against Sears, Roebuck & Company by consumers and attorneys general in more than forty
states. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1994,
at 106, 107. In an attempt to revive lagging sales in its automotive service centers, Sears management
imposed minimum work quotas, productivity incentives, product-specific sales quotas, paid its automotive service salesmen and mechanics with commissions based on sales, and exerted considerable pres-
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individual actors by suggesting that a focus on the environment that
contributed to their misconduct is warranted. Instead, my goal is simply to demonstrate the extraordinary amount of influence that the organization (through senior management) has on the level of misconduct in its ranks--an influence that is obscured by perceptions of organizational misconduct as an agency cost problem stemming from
the acts of individual deviant agents.
2. Misconduct and Organizational Performance
In addition, many legal scholars assume, either implicitly or
explicitly, that many forms of agent misconduct provide no potential
benefits to the organization itself. My goal in this subsection, however, is to provide several examples of conduct typically thought to
provide no organizational benefits and to demonstrate the circumstances under which this assumption may be false. I do not offer conclusive proof that such misconduct positively impacts the bottom
line; the research in this area is too preliminary to warrant such a
conclusion. Instead, my goal is simply to induce greater skepticism
toward the claim that these actions necessarily reflect the isolated
misconduct of a single or small group of deviant agents who have
succeeded--despite management’s best efforts--to violate laws or
company policies.
Some incidents of agent misconduct provide such obvious potential benefits for the firm that the inevitable organizational disavowals of such conduct as the acts of a deviant or “rogue” employee
should be viewed with immediate skepticism.93 The most recent
variation on this scenario has arisen in connection with the recent
mutual fund scandal. For example, in early November 2003, state and
federal authorities charged seven former Prudential employees with
securities fraud in connection with mutual fund market-timing trades
on behalf of large hedge fund clients but did not charge Prudential or
its senior management team. The brokers claimed, however, that both
management and the firm’s compliance department were fully aware
of the trades and rewarded the brokers handsomely for the fees they
brought in.94
sure on automotive center employees to perform more work. Id. Predictably, many employees responded
by defrauding customers through sales of unnecessary parts and services. Id. at 108. Sears eventually
settled the suits for sixty million dollars. Id.
93.
Paine, supra note 92, at 106 (noting that business “executives are quick to describe any
wrongdoing as an isolated incident, the work of a rogue employee,” but that “unethical business practice
involves the tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflects the values, attitudes, beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an organization’s operating culture”).
94.
David Barboza, Brokers Say Prudential Approved Trading, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2003, at C1.
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Other forms of organizational misconduct, however, may
provide less obvious organizational benefits. This section discusses
three examples of agent misconduct that, at first blush, seem to provide no potential benefits for shareholder principals: “rogue” trading,
discrimination, and financial fraud.
a)

Rogue Trading
“Rogue,” or unauthorized, trading may appear to be a classic
example of occupational--as opposed to organizational--misconduct
that causes only harm to the corporate enterprise, as evidenced by the
many large and highly publicized rogue trading losses throughout the
years. This perception of rogue trading as isolated incidences of occupational misconduct is reinforced by the presence of extensive
written conduct codes and costly compliance programs apparently
designed to deter unauthorized trading. However, the same environment that gives rise to rogue trading may also foster other traits--for
example, greed, independence, and risk-taking--that result in more
profitable traders.95 As a result, shareholder principals may be willing
to tolerate some rogue trading losses, so long as they are offset by the
benefits of a more profitable trading floor.
First, traders tend to have a heightened sense of materialism,
because the trading floor climate is designed to foster such an attitude.96 Rather than rewarding successful traders with impressive titles
or moves up the career ladder, the trading floor hierarchy tends to

According to the Massachusetts Securities Division, charges may be brought against Prudential if it appears that high-level executives knew about or sanctioned the illicit trades. Id. As previously stated,
however, such direct knowledge of or participation in organizational misconduct by senior management
is extremely rare. Instead, the far more typical situation occurs when management creates an environment in which such conduct is encouraged and rewarded. Often, the most that can be concluded is that
management set up a system that allowed or encouraged the misconduct to take place, then took steps to
remain willfully ignorant of the behavior. See, e.g., id. (discussing vacations, bonuses, and management
praise bestowed on the indicted brokers due to the large commissions earned on their hedge fund accounts).
95.
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79
Or. L. Rev. 301, 316 (2000) (arguing that some financial institutions have made a conscious decision to
foster an organizational climate that gives rise to at least some rogue trading, because to do so may
maximize trading floor profits, and thus management compensation and status). The problem is likely
exacerbated by a variety of behavioral factors, including the tendency to trust those whom we have
trusted in the past. Because the events that give rise to large rogue-trading losses involve serial decisionmaking and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the firm may tend towards an irrational escalation of commitment. Id.
96.
Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street 18
(1996). As stated by one bond trader, “[m]oney is more than just a medium of exchange; it is a measure
of one’s ‘winnings.’ It provides an identity that prevails over charisma, physical attractiveness, or sociability as the arbiter of success and power on the bond-trading floor. The top-earning trader is king of the
mountain.” Id. at 30.

ORGANIZATIONAL MISCONDUCT

33

consist only of traders who earn more money for the firm and receive
higher bonuses, versus traders who earn less.97
Second, only individuals comfortable with taking large risks
are attracted to, and survive in, trading floor jobs.98 The compensation
structure at most trading institutions, which is based almost exclusively on trading profits earned in the current fiscal year, exacerbates
this attitude by sending a message that short-term profitability will be
rewarded even if incurred at the cost of taking greater risks.99 The
high number of largely unsuccessful attempts by financial institutions
to revise traders’ compensation packages indicates that managers of
financial institutions are aware of the potentially perverse incentives
being created, but have yet to find a mechanism for eradicating them
that is compatible with encouraging the most profitable trading
strategies.100
Finally, traders tend to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial, operating in an independent and often uncooperative environment. As a
result, traders may view their primary obligation as maximizing the
value of their own account and feel little duty to supervise those
around them for potential violations of trading rules.101
97.

Krawiec, supra note 95, at 329.
The impact of organizational environment and selection processes on individual risk-taking attitudes and behavior has been a subject of study for many researchers. See, e.g., James G. March & Zur
Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 Mgmt. Sci. 1404 (1987). March and
Shapira explain that
[a]lthough they [(managers)] undoubtedly vary in their individual
propensities to take risks, those variations are obscured by processes
of selection that reduce the heterogeneity among managers and encourage them to believe in their ability to control the odds, by systems
of organizational controls and incentives that dictate risk taking behavior in significant ways, and by variations in the demand for risk taking
produced by the context within which choice takes place.
Id. at 1414.
99.
Krawiec, supra note 95, at 330; When Words Are Not Bonds: Wall Street Pay, Economist,
Feb. 19, 1994, at 90 (stating that Wall Street “bonuses account for at least 75% of total remuneration”).
100.
For example, after its own rogue trading scandal in 1994, Salomon Brothers attempted to revise its compensation system by providing investment bankers, traders, and other employees with as
much as half their pay in Salomon Brothers stock at a fifteen percent discount, which could not be sold
for five years. Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Looks at Backing Out of Pay Plan, Wall St. J., Apr. 25,
1995, at C1. After the announcement, Salomon lost twenty of its two hundred managing directors, including several top traders. Id. The plan was discontinued. Id.; see also Pay Dirt: Salomon Brothers,
Economist, July 1, 1995, at 67. Attempts at such revisions by other financial institutions have met with
a similar fate. See Bonus Points, Economist, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71 (discussing efforts at various financial
services firms to restructure their compensation systems in an effort to reduce agency costs and unauthorized activities).
101.
Abolafia, supra note 96, at 28-29; Gordon L. Clark, Rogues and Regulation in Global Finance: Maxwell, Leeson and the City of London, 31 Regional Stud. 221, 226 (stating that “[t]he firm
deliberately sets-off their traders one against the other, and from the firm’s own resources so that each
trader’s performance can be directly compared; group-based or team-based organizational modes of
trading are eschewed at this level of the firm in favour of a model which can identify and reward the
98.
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Although these traits may contribute to rogue traders who
violate the firm’s risk and loss limits, firms may tolerate--and even
encourage--those traits because such tolerance also may create more
profitable traders. For example, a recent comparison of United States
and Japanese trading floors shows that U.S. trading firms tend to follow a “market-control pattern” in which traders are given high authority, few risk or loss limits, and high incentive compensation.102
Japanese trading firms, by contrast, tend to follow a “bureaucratic
control pattern” under which traders have little discretion, strict risk
and loss limits, low incentive compensation, and a high level of organizational control.103 The study found that the market-control firms
were significantly more profitable than their bureaucratic-control
counterparts and were willing to tolerate higher levels of “acceptable
risk.” In other words, traders at market-control-style firms had shared
values regarding the acceptability of higher risk levels within the
firm.104
b)

Discrimination
The notion that organizational diversity is “good for business”
has become a common mantra both among organizational leaders and
in the management literature.105 Accordingly, discrimination may appear at first blush a simple matter of individual employee deviance

best and the brightest”).
102.
Srilata A. Zaheer, Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading Rooms in the U.S.
and Japan, in Performance of Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, Regulation 462 (Patrick
T. Harker & Stavros A. Zenios eds., 2000).
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 28. Interestingly, the market-control firms did not have significantly higher levels of actual risk. This may not tell us much about the propensity for rogue trading, however. By definition, traders attempt to hide unauthorized trades from the formal control system, meaning that it may not have
shown up in the study. Because the study was not designed to and did not measure the incidence of trading violations within the firm, it cannot be used as evidence regarding the comparative levels of actual
rogue trading within the two types of firms. However, the findings on profitability and acceptable risk
levels are supportive of the notion that market-control-style firms may have a propensity for both higher
profitability and higher levels of trading violations.
105.
Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 Admin. Sci. Q. 229, 229 (2001) (discussing
advice in management literature that diversity enhances workgroup performance); David B. Wilkins,
From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" To "Diversity Is Good For Business": The Rise Of Market-Based
Diversity Arguments And The Fate Of The Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1548, 1571-1591
(2004) (discussing the widespread attachment to the belief that diversity enhances corporate profitability
and competitiveness); Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 330-331, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) (noting
that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.”) (citing to Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae *331 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as
Amicus Curiae 3-4.)
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that cannot properly be characterized as organizational misconduct.106
Unfortunately for those with hopes for a more diverse and integrated
American workforce, the empirical research indicates that the effect
of diversity on organizational performance is complicated and uncertain, providing both benefits and costs depending on context, time
frame, and the type of diversity in question.107
For example, researchers have studied the effects of two types
of diversity--diversity with respect to “underlying attributes” and diversity with respect to “observable attributes”--on several different
measures of workgroup performance, including outcomes, processes,
and individual perceptions and satisfaction. Diversity on underlying
attributes--such as education, technical abilities, tenure in the organization, socioeconomic background, personality characteristics, or
personal values--has been found in some studies to positively impact
outcomes by expanding the set of possibilities considered and discussed, leading to more creative solutions to organizational problems.108 At the same time, however, some studies have found that diversity on underlying attributes negatively affects workgroup processes by imposing costs, such as increased turnover and more formal,
less frequent communication among workgroup members.109 Some
studies have found these process losses to be offset, however, by increased contact with members outside of the workgroup, resulting in
a broader range of ideas considered by the workgroup.110
In contrast, the results of research on the impact of observable
attributes such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender provide grounds for
more pessimism about the effects of diversity on workgroup performance. For example, demographically heterogeneous groups have
performed both better and worse than demographically homogenous
106.

This attitude is reflected in the early case law involving workplace discrimination. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“The issue before the Court is
whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unauthorized sex misconduct of one employee to another.” (footnote omitted)); Corne v. Bausch and Lomb,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that a supervisor’s harassing conduct appeared to be
“nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism”).
107.
Ely & Thomas, supra note 105, at 229; Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for
Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 Acad.
Mgmt. Rev. 402, 405-12 (1996) (summarizing the research on the impact of workgroup diversity on
performance); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly, III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 Res. Organizational Behav. 77 (1998) (reviewing over
eighty studies by psychologists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, communication and education
researchers, and organizational scholars).
108.
See Milliken & Martins, supra note 107, at 405-12 (summarizing the literature). Researchers
consider it important, however, that the majority of studies finding positive outcome effects of diversity
are laboratory studies rather than field studies. See Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 107, at 79.
109. Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 107, at 94-96.
110. Id. at 94-98.
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groups in terms of workgroup outcomes, sometimes considering a
greater number and diversity of alternatives in a decisionmaking task
and sometimes not. Furthermore, some studies have shown that, to
the extent any creativity benefits do emerge from demographically
heterogeneous groups, such benefits are likely to emerge only after
the group has been together for some time.
In addition, any positive impact on the outcome variable may
be overshadowed by the negative impacts of demographic diversity
on the process variable. In other words, to the extent that any outcome benefits may emerge from workgroup heterogeneity, they may
be outweighed by the higher transaction costs of managing a demographically diverse workforce. As a general rule, more demographically diverse workgroups experience higher turnover rates, greater
absenteeism of the dissimilar group members, lower levels of integration and communication, and lower levels of satisfaction and identification with the group. In addition, individuals who are dissimilar
from their supervisors on demographic variables tend to receive
lower performance evaluations. As noted by Frances Milliken and
Luis Martins, “[t]he consistency of these findings suggests . . . that
groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out individuals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to
drive out diversity is managed.”111
In a recent paper, Professor Donald Langevoort provides a
different theory that, if true, also predicts a lack of organizational incentives for the creation of a diverse workforce. Langevoort cogently
argues that the mechanisms by which middle managers are hired,
tested, and promoted within many firms reward the presence of psychological traits--including over-confidence, risk taking, and
“grease”--that are more commonly found in white males than in other
demographic groups.112 If this is true, then corporate America’s
mechanisms for selecting top managers may result in more profitable
companies that exclude women and minorities from their upper ranks
and impose other negative externalities on society through the choice
of business decisions that they make.
According to Langevoort, many companies organize middle
managers into work teams that must solve some set of problems and
111.

Milliken & Martins, supra note 107, at 420; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1757, 1788 (2003) (book review) (arguing
that “greater employee homogeneity decreases the transaction costs of managing a [diverse] workforce”).
112.
Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: Grease,
Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors 15-16, 19-20 (forthcoming, 61 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. (2004)).
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then negotiate with non-team members within the firm the perception
of how the team has performed.113 Typically, middle managers are rotated through different work groups and evaluated on both a team and
individual basis.114 Accordingly, rising to the top of the management
pool requires iterated success--more likely if the individual is confident and willing to take risks115--and necessitates a psychological
makeup referred to by researchers as “High Machiavellianism,” or
“high-Mach.”116
Both self-confidence and the tendency to take risks are believed to vary across gender, racial, and ethnic lines.117 Langevoort
argues that the third trait required for managerial success--grease--is
also more likely to be present in the dominant demographic group.
He hypothesizes that “greasy” people--those high-Mach individuals
who are able to effortlessly make strong in-group connections when
required and yet defect when it is in their self-interest--are likely to
succeed in the managerial tournament.118 By contrast, “gritty” people-those who are unable to perform this routine successfully--will
not.119 If the process of serially forming, and then dropping, strong ingroup connections is facilitated by homogeneity, the mere fact of being different from the dominant majority may insert grit into the
process. In other words, members of racial, gender, or cultural minority groups may be grittier simply by virtue of being different, unless
they are willing and able to successfully mimic the behavior of white

113. Id. at 12.
114. Id.
Id. at 15-16. Self-confidence is positively associated with the ability to persuade others,
greater persistence, and a willingness to take risks. Id. at 15; Simon Gervais et al., The Positive Role
of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy (Rodney L. White Ctr. For Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 15-02, 2002), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2005); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 Mgmt. Sci. 17, 27-29 (1993) (arguing that optimistic bias in
organizational judgments leads to risk-taking). In any large organization where getting ahead is based on
iterated success of the nature described here, some percentage of “lucky risk-takers” are likely to distinguish themselves both from the unlucky risk-takers (who presumably fall out of the tournament early)
and those who play it safe (thereby lasting in the tournament up to some point, but ultimately underperforming the lucky risk-takers). Langevoort, supra note 112, at 15.
116.
Langevoort, supra note 112, at 18. High-Mach individuals possess the ability to cooperate
and display intense in-group loyalty when necessary, while behaving in an aggressively competitive
manner to out-group members. Id. at 17-18. Importantly, high-Mach individuals are able to seamlessly
defect and switch to a new in-group when self-advancement so dictates. Id. at 18; see also Samuel
Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. Econ. Lit. 1137, 1161-62
(2001).
117.
Langevoort, supra note 112, at 16.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id.
115.
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males.120 Langevoort argues that, although this may be efficient
within the firm structure, “senior executive suites . . . overpopulated
by high-Mach risk-takers, filled with hubris, adept at self-deception,
and empty of strong ethical grounding” may create troubling negative
externalities associated with the kind of business decisions they
make.121
Similarly, the exclusion of certain demographic out-groups
from the organization has historically been used by some corporations to inculcate employee loyalty and pride, or to increase employee productivity. For example, southern textile mills once explicitly refused to hire African Americans in order to create a sense of
privilege in their white workers.122 This sense of privilege was then
employed to justify the mills’ low wages and unsafe working conditions.123
In addition, Ford Motor Company purposely excluded women
from assembly line work during the early twentieth century. In so doing, the company was able to create an image of assembly-line work
as masculine, calling into question the manhood of employees who
could not meet target production levels and paying those who could a
wage that, in the words of one Ford manager at the time, would help
them “to be better men.”124 Although changed social mores and the
advent of antidiscrimination laws have presumably induced organizations to abandon such practices as a conscious or explicit mechanism
for incentivizing labor, the research on workgroup homogeneity discussed above suggests that organizations may still derive benefits
from the exclusion of demographic out-group members.
I do not mean to suggest that organizations are free to create a
completely homogenous workforce or that senior management consciously or intentionally excludes on the basis of race or gender simply to improve cooperation and loyalty among employees. Both legal
and societal constraints militate against such behavior. In addition, I
120.

Id. at 20; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev.
1259 (2000); Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-Group Identification as a
Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual Mobility, 72 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 617 (1997).
124. Langevoort, supra note 112, at 22-23.
122.
Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis
of American Business History 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9029, 2002);
David L. Carlton, Mill and Town in South Carolina, 1880-1920 (1982).
123.
Lamoreaux et al., supra note 122, at 28.
124.
Id. at 28-29; Wayne A. Lewchuk, Men and Monotony: Fraternalism as a Managerial Strategy
at the Ford Motor Company, 53 J. Econ. Hist. 824, 843 (1993).

ORGANIZATIONAL MISCONDUCT

39

do not claim to have offered any “proof” that discriminatory behavior
positively affects firm profits. As already noted, the state of research
in this field is not sufficiently developed to support such a conclusion. Instead, my goal is simply to call into question the automatic
assumption that behaviors such as those discussed in this section represent pure occupational misconduct that provides no organizational
benefits, as opposed to organizational misconduct that provides subtle but tangible benefits to the organizational enterprise. If these behaviors do provide such benefits, then the legal regime’s assumption
that internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to curb agent
misconduct will suffice to correct this behavior is erroneous.
c)

Financial Fraud
Financial fraud is particularly difficult to categorize, as the
creation of false profitability may benefit shareholder principals under some circumstances and not in others. Some instances of financial fraud undoubtedly harm shareholders. Indeed, in many cases, defrauding shareholders is the ultimate goal of the fraudulent scheme.
In addition, when financial fraud is engaged in for the purpose of
concealing poor management or creating the illusion that some division is profitable when it is actually a drain on organizational resources and should be sold, shareholders are harmed.125
At the same time, however, some well-known instances of financial fraud were the result of attempts by organizational management to create the appearance of profitability in order to derive some
benefit--for example, outside funding--that would augment shareholder wealth. For instance, alleged Kidder Peabody “rogue trader”
Joseph Jett contended that Kidder management had full knowledge of
and encouraged his fictitious trades because they created the temporary illusion that Kidder’s trading operations were profitable. This allowed Kidder to obtain a large loan from Union Bank of Switzerland
that Kidder badly needed to provide operating capital.126
Similarly, part of the asserted rationale for Enron’s false financial statements was that revealing the truth about it’s financial
condition would result in a credit-rating downgrade, severely hampering it’s ability to conduct its derivatives business and undermining

125.

This is true even if a short-term shareholder owning stock only in that company would benefit from an inflated stock price. Because most shares in large companies are owned by diversified shareholders who trade securities fairly actively, portfolio value should be enhanced by accurate reporting,
even if the value of an individual stock would be temporarily enhanced by false reporting.
126.
In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Enron’s profitability and share price.127 In addition, Enron’s fraudulent reporting regarding its trading floor operations was reportedly
undertaken to enhance it’s share price. In other words, the allegation
is that Enron smoothed the volatility of its trading floor profits, thus
making the company appear less risky than it was and, correspondingly, enhancing share price.128
B. Public Choice Reasons
In prior work, I have presented evidence that public choice
theory may explain some of the legal system’s extreme reliance on
internal compliance structures as a liability determinant.129 According
to the interest group branch of public choice theory, well-organized
interest groups are able to extract benefits from the government while
imposing the costs on less organized groups, typically broad-based
segments of the general public, such as consumers.130
As one of the most organized, effective, and well-financed interest groups involved in the political process, it may seem surprising
that business interests have not defeated the development of organizational liability provisions (and the recent proliferation of organizational criminal liability provisions, in particular). Given the success
that business interests frequently demonstrate in defeating the implementation of legal rules that they consider onerous, organizational
liability provisions thus present--at first glance--a bit of a mystery. In
other words, why have business interests not blocked the passage of
organizational liability provisions such as those discussed in this Article?
Although several potential explanations are plausible, one obvious answer is that organizational liability provisions are not as
costly to business organizations as they may at first appear.131 Al127.

See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev.
1275, 1323-24 (2002).
128.
Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”, 48 Vill. L.
Rev. 1245, 1260 (2003); see also Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Freddie May Have Understated
Profits by up to $4.5 Billion, Wall St. J., June 26, 2003, at C1 (discussing disclosures by Freddie Mac
that it violated accounting rules and, in some cases, understated profits in order to smooth volatility in
earnings).
129.
See Krawiec, supra note 21.
130.
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3
(1971). Another branch of public choice theory, voting theory, is based on the work of Kenneth Arrow
and holds that determinations based on majority rule may give rise to random or shifting outcomes, a
process known as “cycling.” Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).
131.
Organizational liability provisions may also reflect an agency cost problem. If the presence
of organizational liability results in a lower probability of personal liability for corporate officers and directors, then organizational liability may represent an attempt by officers and directors to deflect their
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though business interests and those who could face personal liability
for organizational violations (such as boards of directors under In re
Caremark International inc. Derivative Litigation132) would presumably prefer to suffer no organizational liability for the conduct of employee agents, a legal regime that conditions or mitigates liability on
the basis of internal compliance structures--while expensive and
wasteful--is far less onerous than actually altering current business
practices or paying damages for agent misconduct. As a result, when
the public outcry for constraints on organizational misconduct becomes too loud for lawmakers to ignore, business interests may agree
to heightened organizational liability in exchange for a “safe harbor”
in the form of mitigation based on internal compliance structures.133
At the same time, legal compliance professionals benefit immensely--both financially and in terms of their importance and status
within organizations--from a legal regime that conditions liability on
the presence of internal compliance structures. Perhaps for this reason, legal compliance professionals have been at the forefront of the
push to adopt internal compliance structures, sometimes overstating
to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt such structures and the benefits of having such structures in place.134
Although both business organizations and legal compliance
professionals have had a substantial impact on the development of internal compliance-based legal regimes in the United States, the two
groups have made that impact in different ways. For example, business organizations (including the Business Roundtable) lobbied hard
for an internal compliance-based mitigation of sentences under the
OSGs.135 By contrast, legal compliance professionals appear to have
satisfied their agenda more indirectly and have played a particularly

personal liability onto organizational defendants. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1253-55.
132. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
133.
See Khanna, supra note 5, at 102-03 (querying why business interests have not managed to
extract such a safe harbor). This public outcry may be especially likely to occur following the disclosure
of a series of corporate misdeeds during a weak economic period. Id. at 104. For example, commentators have explained the political climate leading to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Sarbanes-Oxley on exactly these grounds. See, e.g., id.
134.
See Krawiec, supra note 21 (describing this literature); Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58
at 134-40 (describing this trend in connection with sexual harassment training); Bisom-Rapp, Ounce,
supra note 75 at 13-15 (same).
135.
William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power,
and Corporate Crime Control, 27 Law & Soc’y Rev. 741, 746 tbl.2 (1993) (providing figures on the
lobbying activity of the Business Roundtable, National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of
Commerce, numerous corporations, and other interested public and private groups in connection with
the OSGs); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 370 (discussing pressure from the business community to
adopt guidelines that account for organizations’ internal compliance efforts).

42

FLORIDA STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 32

important role in the development of judicially crafted internal compliance-based liability standards.
The judicial recognition of internal compliance-based liability
defenses follows a particular pattern that highlights the important role
played by legal compliance professionals in the development of
common law compliance-based organizational liability standards.
First, the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate
both a new legal risk and their ability to contain that risk through internal compliance structures has been well documented.136 Several
studies, for example, have documented the extent to which legal and
management journals overstated the legal benefits of internal grievance procedures in defending against liability in sexual harassment
suits and the need for personnel practices designed to minimize employer liability in wrongful discharge suits.137 Second, business organizations (either unaware of, or disinterested in, the fact that the
rendered advice is incorrect) adopt the legal compliance professionals’ recommendations.138 Third, when faced with liability decisions,
courts look to industry standards to determine whether the organization has met its duty to avoid the harm in question.139 As a result, the
recommendations of internal compliance professionals become a part
of the liability determination and deviations from them result in
costly liability determinations.
136.

See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 529 (discussing the evidence on this); Donald C. Langevoort
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997).
137.
See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Soc’y Rev. 47 (1992) (studying the extent to which personnel, legal academic, and legal practitioner journals overstate the legal risk of wrongful discharge suits);
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth 105 Am. J. Soc. 406 (1999) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Legal Regulation] (studying the impact
that legal compliance professionals had on the development of grievance procedures as a legal defense
under sexual harassment law); Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, A Tale of Two Sectors: The Spread of AntiHarassment Remedies Among Public and Private Employers (draft on file with author) (studying the
role played by personnel professionals in the development and acceptance of internal grievance procedures as a defense to organizational liability in sexual harassment cases and concluding that “the legal
remedy to harassment was clearly fashioned by a group with a professional interest in promoting that
remedy.”)
138.
See Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 137, at 40 (stating that the courts did not lead the development of legal rules governing the role of grievance procedures as a defense in sexual harassment suits
but instead followed what the corporations were doing at the behest of personnel professionals); Edelman et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 137, at 451 (documenting the diffusion of internal grievance
procedures within organizations prior to the legitimation of the defense by the courts).
139.
Dobbin & Kelley, supra note 137, at 40 (noting that the courts followed and legitimated what
business organizations had been doing--adopting internal grievance procedures--rather than fashioning a
remedy on their own); Edelman et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 137, at 440 (noting that, eventually,
the Supreme Court legitimated the originally erroneous legal advice that personnel professionals had
rendered regarding grievance procedures, by establishing them as part of a two-part affirmative defense).
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At the same time, the solutions to perceived legal problems
recommended by legal compliance professionals are more palatable
to management, because they disrupt managerial discretion and current business practice as little as possible. An internal compliancebased regime thus may represent an equilibrium agreement among
business interests, legal compliance professionals, and lawmakers
that satisfies public demands for regulation while doing little to disrupt business practices and enhancing the profitability and importance of another powerful interest group--legal compliance professionals.
VI. THE CHOICE OF VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PARTY
This Article has, for the most part, addressed only the role of
organizational liability for agent misconduct. Under some circumstances, however, cogent arguments can be made that senior management or board liability should supplement or substitute for the organization as the vicariously liable party. Although, this Article does
not reject such a possibility, the obstacles to and problems with this
approach should be briefly noted.
First, the limited assets of organizational agents is a commonly asserted rationale for organizational-level liability in the first
place.140 Although senior managers and board members may have
deeper pockets than lower-level violators, the harm caused by many
acts of organizational misconduct is nonetheless likely to exceed
most individuals’ assets, leading to a failure to fully internalize the
costs of misconduct and, therefore, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct.141
In addition, imposing liability--especially criminal liability-on an individual who did not actively participate in and was unaware
of the misconduct in question is a rare, but not unheard of, move in
the American legal regime.142 As a result, fairness concerns are likely
140.

See supra note 6 (discussing this argument).
Although director and officer liability insurance policies may pay for many vicarious liability
judgments against officers and directors, because the firm typically pays the bulk of these premiums, deterrence may still be undermined.
142
Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 348 (2003) (noting that, although
collective sanctions may seem natural in tribal or clan-based societies, in “modern, liberal societies,
however, where the relevant moral unit is the individual, punishing groups for the misdeeds of individuals will be regarded with deep skepticism.”); Adam Liptak, Is the Group Responsible for the Individual’s
Crime?, 136 (14) SCHOLASTIC UPDATE 16 (May 10, 2004). In contrast, many other cultures hold individuals or groups – for example, family members or fellow villagers – not connected to the misconduct
responsible on the theory that such groups or individuals may be better positioned to identify and punish
culpable individuals, and may be motivated to do so by the threat of collective liability. Levinson, supra
this note at 348 (stating that, “[g]roup members might be punished not because they are deemed collec141.
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to compel courts to impose this type of individual liability only in the
most egregious cases, such as when the court is convinced that management knew about or recklessly determined to remain unaware of
ongoing misconduct. If this is so, then most of the benefits of vicarious liability will be lost and organizational liability will remain a
necessary tool to deter organizational misconduct. Nonetheless, further research into the choice of vicariously liable party is needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In closing, I should emphasize not only this Article’s conclusions, but also reinforce what it does not conclude. Specifically, it is
not the contention of this Article that internal compliance structures
can never play a role in deterring organizational misconduct. Indeed,
internal compliance structures--in the hands of a competent and
committed management team--may play a central role in the organization’s preventive approach to organizational misconduct, depending on the size and structure of the specific organization.143 In addition, by emphasizing the important role played by organizational culture and management commitment to ethical behavior in deterring
misconduct, I am not advocating a legal regime in which courts,
agencies, or prosecutors attempt to directly evaluate those factors in
assessing organizational liability for agent misconduct. As with internal compliance structures, legal decisionmakers are unlikely to possess sufficient information to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of
these factors in any reliable way. As a result, I conclude that the
United States legal regime’s move away from strict vicarious liability
to internal compliance-based liability is unjustified by either theory
or empirical evidence.
At the same time, the obstacles to a return to strict vicarious
liability are strong and are both theoretical and political. As a theotively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify,
monitor, and control responsible individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.”);
Liptak, supra this note.
143.
See generally Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, supra note 72. Very small, centralized organizations
may find formal internal compliance structures unnecessary and prohibitively expensive. Perhaps for
this reason, small businesses have expressed some concern that they are disadvantaged by the OSG requirements, although firm size is taken into account in the sentencing guidelines. See Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1, cmt. n.2(C). It is unclear, however, whether many small firms
would gain the benefit of the OSG mitigation provisions, even in the absence of the internal compliance
provisions of the Guidelines. This is because many small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines
are ineligible for sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in the misconduct. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior--The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit (unpublished paper presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on
Value Inquiry, Tulsa, OK (Apr. 26, 2001)), available at 1317 PLI/Corp. 113, 131 (2002).
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retical matter, so long as legal academics and legal decisionmakers
continue to view organizational misconduct as a principal-agent
problem which can be fully addressed through better policing, and
ignore the subtle, but tangible, benefits that may flow to the organizational enterprise from such conduct, the legal system will continue to
gravitate toward solutions that provide incentives for “policing,”
without ever addressing the root causes of organizational misconduct.
As a political matter, the current legal regime may exist, not
because it effectively addresses organizational misconduct, but because it satisfies the needs of a variety of powerful interest groups,
including business organizations and legal compliance professionals,
while at the same time addressing the occasional (though increasingly frequent) public outcry for constraints on organizational misbehavior.

